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INTRODUCTION
Justice Clarence Thomas is a flashpoint for liberals and moder-
ates' concern about the ascendancy of conservative thought in law
and politics. Both have denounced Justice Thomas's judicial phi-
losophy and decisions in scathing terms since his appointment to the
Supreme Court in 1991. Justice Thomas has been called a stooge of
the political right and a hypocrite.' African American leaders have
skewered Justice Thomas in particularly personal terms, describing
him as "look[ing] black, but think[ing] white"2 and as "the Whitest
man in America" in terms of his "political program" and "repudiation
of civil rights."3 Thomas's jurisprudence in race-related cases is a spe-
cial target of contempt. Proponents of affirmative action are caustic
in their criticisms of Justice Thomas, in light of his opposition to race-
conscious policies. That he apparently was a beneficiary of affirma-
tive action, but now denies others the opportunities that he has en-
joyed, animates claims that Justice Thomas's race jurisprudence
Visiting Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law (2004-05) and Associate
Professor of Law and History, Washington University, St. Louis. J.D., Yale University; Ph.D.,
MA., Duke University; B.A., Furman University. Thanks to Lani Guinier, Kim Forde-Mazrui,
Stephen Smith, and Daniel Nagin for comments on prior drafts of this Essay. This Essay builds
on some of the comments that I made at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional
Law 2004 Symposium, Race Jurisprudence and the Supreme Court: Where Do We Go from Here?
See KEN FOsKETr, JUDGING THOMAS 2, 231-32, 288-89, 297, 314 (2004) (enumerating a
number of criticisms of Justice Thomas, ranging from his failure to help other black people af-
ter he "made it" to how he "obeys" Justice Scalia); ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS
350-52, 360 (2001) (describing the aggressive support of the political right and the vehement
opposition of liberals and some moderates to Justice Thomas's nomination to the Supreme
Court).
2 THOMAS, supra note 1, at 351 (quoting Derrick Bell on the television program, Nightline).
3 FOSKErT, supra note 1, at 289 (quoting Derrick Bell and Manning Marable, respectively);
see also id. at 4, 135, 231, 288-89 (likening Justice Thomas to a Judas, Benedict Arnold, and
Brutus to the black community).
4 See FoSKETr, supra note 1, at 289 (describing criticism leveled by supporters of affirmative
action).
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amounts to a betrayal.5 Justice Thomas is viewed as the antithesis of,
and a most unworthy successor to Justice Thurgood Marshall.6
It is understandable why those who favor broad-based, structural
remedies for discrimination reject much of Justice Thomas's juris-
prudence. Justice Thomas's "originalist" interpretation of the Consti-
tution and libertarian political philosophy lead him to positions that
break with those favored by liberal advocates of racial justice at almost
every turn.' This is true across a wide variety of Justice Thomas's de-
cisions, includin opinions in voting rights, criminal law, and affirma-
tive action cases.
Like many others, I find much injustice Thomas's judicial record
troubling. As one example, his concurring opinion in Missouri v. Jen-
kins,9 the 1995 school desegregation case, strikes me as deeply flawed.
In Jenkins, Justice Thomas concluded that even voluntary transfers by
white students to magnet schools in central cities were beyond the
scope of a proper remedial order, despite a history of de jure segre-
gation and persistent de facto segregation in the central city schools.1 °
Justice Thomas's decision was driven by his rejection of what he
viewed as the post-Brown v. Board of Education" orthodoxy, which pos-
tulates that, "if integration... is the only way that blacks can receive a
proper education, then there must be something inferior about
See BENJAMIN HOOKS, THE MARCH FOR CIVIL RIGHTS: THE BENJAMIN HOOKS STORY 297
(2004) (stating that "Clarence Thomas's fast rise was a result of affirmative action").
6 The NAACP opposed the Thomas nomination. See HOOKS, supra note 5, at 297-309 (de-
scribing discussions of Thomas's nomination within the NAACP and Thomas's attempts to in-
fluence the Association's vote). Other prominent black groups, including the Congressional
Black Caucus and the National Bar Association ("NBA"), were indecisive about the Thomas
nomination. The NBA's judicial selection committee voted against Thomas, 6 to 5, and its
board of governors then voted in favor of Thomas, 23 to 21. The NBA convention ultimately
rejected his nomination by a vote of 128 to 124. See THOMAS, supra note 1, at 358-59. But many
civil rights groups supported or expressed no opinion about Thomas's nomination to the Su-
preme Court because of his race, despite misgivings about his positions on issues such as af-
firmative action. This was because they presumed that the Bush administration would only
nominate conservatives, and they preferred a black conservative to a white one. See THOMAS,
supra note 1, at 351, 357-59 (discussing preference for black rather than white conservatives).
According to polls, a majority of blacks supported Thomas's nomination, despite disagreement
with many of his views. See FOSKETT, supra note 1, at 289 (noting perception that Thomas was
unsympathetic to problems faced by African Americans); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 352, 359
(basing support on various theories).
7 See THOMAS, supra note 1, at 500-01 (describing the growing schism between Thomas's
opinions and that of liberal proponents of racialjustice). By racial justice, I mean equal oppor-
tunity and substantive equality for people of color.
8 See FOsKETr, supra note 1, at 71-72, 288-89, 298, 314, 318 (describing Thomas's libertar-
ian political philosophy and his renown as the most conservative justice).
9 515 U.S. 70, 114-39 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
10 See id. at 117-18 (arguing that voluntary desegregation is beyond the scope of the rem-
edy).
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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blacks.' 2 According to Justice Thomas, this erroneous assumption
stigmatizes African American individuals and institutions and is un-
supported by sufficient evidence demonstrating the utility of interra-
cial contact to black students.13 That federal judges have issued "ex-
traordinary" and exorbitantly expensive structural injunctions
mandating school integration is, then, a misguided abuse of power,
according to Thomas.
4
In some respects, Justice Thomas's focus on stigmatic injury and
his repudiation of the assumption of black inferiority are compelling,
as I will discuss below. But he plainly overstates his case in Jenkins.
The right to equal educational opportunity articulated in Brown" and
subsequent cases cuts against Justice Thomas's conclusion that even
voluntary, cross district desegregation is unlawful. Similarly, his cate-
gorical claim that desegregation is an ineffective remedy for educa-
tional inequality"7 is overstated. The structural injunctions put in
place in many school districts during the late 1960s and early 1970s,
after years of resistance to Brown, have desegregated some school sys-
tems, including through voluntary transfer programs. 8 Many studies
demonstrate that interracial contact made possible by virtue of the
injunctions that Justice Thomas excoriates have enhanced the educa-
tional and life opportunities of many African American students.' 9 In
his zeal for protecting students of color from stigmatic harms and
endorsing majority black schools, Justice Thomas overlooks the fact
12 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114, 120-22.
3 Id. at 120-23, n.2 ("[T] here simply is no conclusive evidence that desegregation either has
sparked a permanent jump in the achievement scores of black children, or has remedied any
psychological feelings of inferiority black schoolchildren might have had.").
14 See id. at 124-26 ("Judges have directed or managed the reconstruction of entire institu-
tions and bureaucracies, with little regard for the inherent limitations or their authority.").
15 347 U.S. at 493 (holding that the segregation of schoolchildren solely on the basis of race
is inherently unequal).
1 See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992) (requiring an effective effort to deegregate
before a federal court can partially end supervision of a school district formerly segregated by
law); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (ordering metropolitan remedy for public housing
discrimination in city); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (order-
ing busing to alter school race populations).
17 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 132 (discussing an ineffective school desegregation decree).
18 The success of some plans lasted for a limited period of time due to white flight and other
demographic changes. SeeJames E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 297-307
(1999) (surveying social science studies documenting shorter- and longer-term benefits of racial
and socioeconomic integration for poor minority students in numerous school districts across
the country); see also GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 65-67, 105-06, 130 (1996) (examining short- and long-
term effects of integration based on test scores and other benchmarks).
19 See ORFIELD, supra note 18, at 65-67, 105-06, 130 (discussing relationship between deseg-
regation and improved life chances).
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that many African American students flourish in integrated settings.0
I can think of no convincing justification-legal, practical, or politi-
cal-for denying such students the possibility of integrated educa-
tion, particularly when the contact is initiated by whites and occurs
on a voluntary basis. Jenkins and like decisions have eviscerated Brown
by undermining precedent that sanctions expansive remedies for far-
reaching harms.2
Notwithstanding my disagreement with the views that Justice
Thomas expresses in Jenkins and other cases, I think it would be
wrong to assume, as others seem to have done, that Justice Thomas
lacks genuine concern about racial equality. Justice Thomas has re-
peatedly discussed his experiences of discrimination and expressed
concern about the stigma that flows from racial bias. 2 Thomas's re-
cent public addresses make it abundantly clear that he is aware of the
debilitating effects of racial discrimination.2' Another clue to the
depth of his passions on the subject was revealed during oral argu-
ment in Virginia v. Black, a case before the Court during the 2003
term, involving the constitutionality under the First Amendment of a
statute making cross burning on another's property a felony. 4 Break-
ing his customary silence at oral argument, Justice Thomas informed
his colleagues and counsel that cross burning was "unlike any symbol
in our society," intended to "cause fear," and to "terrorize" blacks and
25other minorities. Justice Thomas's statement was widely viewed as
20 See id. (citing gains in test scores and life opportunities of African American students in
integrated schools).
2 See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979) (establishing a rebuttable
presumption that present racial imbalance was proximately caused by prior intentional, dejure
discrimination); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211-12 (1973) (discussing how a city-
wide desegregation plan based on segregation in one area affected patterns throughout the
city); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 ("Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a dis-
trict court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are in-
herent in equitable remedies.").
22 See, e.g., FOSKETT, supra note 1, at 60-66 (describing Thomas's early childhood experi-
ences in the segregated South); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 500-02 (describing Thomas's press
conferences with black journalists and a speech to Tuskegee University students emphasizing
details of his background).
23 See FOsKETr, supra note 1, at 7, 60-66, 71-72, 292 (describing Thomas's early experiences
with racial stratification by skin color and feelings of racial inferiority in the segregated South);
THOMAS, supra note 1, at 3-4, 320, 357, 400, 500-02 (describing the controversy surrounding
Thomas's confirmation and his own assessment that the experience was one of the most trou-
bling forms of discrimination he had ever experienced). Justice Thomas has sometimes shared
his experiences in what would seem to be self-serving ways, most obviously during his confirma-
tion hearing, after allegations of sexual harassment by Anita Hill, a former employee. See
THOMAS, supra note 1, at 4, 368 (noting Justice Thomas's statements describing his life in pov-
erty and segregation in Georgia and his claim that he was being subjected to a "high-tech lynch-
ing").
24 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
25 Transcript of Oral Argument at the U.S. Supreme Court at 23-24, Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
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"shift[ing] the balance" in the Court's 6-3 decision to uphold the
constitutionality of the statute.26
In addition, Justice Thomas demonstrated his concern about the
inadequate educational opportunities available to low-income, Afri-
can American students in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the 2002 school
voucher case. 7  In Zelman, the Court upheld Cleveland's pilot
voucher program against an Establishment Clause challenge, despite
religiously-affiliated schools' disproportionate participation in the
program. 8 Noting that "failing urban public schools disproportion-
ately affect minority children,"29Justice Thomas rejected the logic of
those who oppose voucher programs including religious schools
based on "formalistic concerns about the Establishment Clause" and
a "romanticized ideal of universal public education."0  "Most black
people have faced too many grim, concrete problems to be roman-
tics," Thomas noted."s In light of the cold realities that poor blacks
face in failing public schools and the "core purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment," 2 Thomas found Cleveland's voucher experi-
ment lawful.
As his decisions in Zelman and Jenkins demonstrate, Justice Tho-
mas's objections to the agenda favored by liberal civil rights groups
seem to turn on remedial considerations rather than on indifference
to bias. He categorically rejects race-conscious remedies. Thus, Jus-
tice Thomas's support for the Cleveland voucher program that pri-
marily benefited poor, minority children turned, in part, on the fact
that the program was not explicitly race conscious. But he has ques-
tioned explicitly race-conscious remedies in school desegregation and
affirmative action cases because, as he sees it, they are premised on
an assumption of black deficiency, and therefore perpetuate the very
stigma that they are designed to remediate.3 Justice Thomas's opin-
26 Black, 538 U.S. at 358-60; see Paul Butler, For Two Justices, Past is Prologue, LEGAL TIMES,
June 30, 2003, at 60.
27 536 U.S. 639, 644-53 (2002) (rejecting establishment clause challenge to school voucher
program despite the fact that ninety-six percent of participants attend religiously-affiliated
schools on grounds that program did not advance or inhibit religion.)
28 Id.
Id. at 681 (Thomas,J., concurring).
"o Id, at 682.
Id. (quoting THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION: MYTIHS AND TRAGEDIES 228 (1972)).
32 id.
33 See FOSKETr, supra note 1, at 72, 292 (noting Thomas's insistence on interpreting laws
strictly to avoid double standards prevalent in the segregated South during his childhood); see
also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (claiming that the
stigma associated with affirmative action tags all blacks as undeserving notwithstanding qualifi-
cations); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 119-22 (1995) (noting studies stating that test score
gap between blacks and whites has narrowed as a result of gains in socioeconomic status rather
than desegregation); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (noting that the elimi-
nation of all racial imbalance is not required by the Constitution).
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ions about how best to remedy racial inequality in education certainly
are subject to debate. But his disagreement with conventional, liberal
perspectives on the best remedies for racial discrimination does not
mean that he is unconcerned about the welfare of African Americans.
Some commentators are dismissive of Justice Thomas's claim that
affirmative action tarnishes the achievements of all minorities . 3 4 Jus-
tice Thomas may well be guilty of becoming fixated on the concept of
racial stigma,"" perhaps based on his own scarring experiences, and
of mischaracterizing the role that racial stigma plays in the lives of
most minorities. There is little reason to believe that most affirmative
action beneficiaries experience the programs as stigmatizing. But
there also is little reason to believe that the stigma of racist stereo-
types is unreal or an examination of it unwarranted within constitu-
tional jurisprudence. In fact, the dignitary harm flowing from racial
discrimination and stereotypes is generating renewed scholarly inter-
est.3 7 One recent commentator has characterized stigma as the "true
source of racial injury in the United States," historically and contem-
porarily ss Thus, Justice Thomas's focus on stigma may well speak to
new impulses in antidiscrimination scholarship and advocacy in the
post-civil rights era.
The heated rhetoric that surrounds Justice Thomas can obfuscate
the depth of his engagement with the issue of racial inequality. Jus-
tice Thomas's race jurisprudence should be considered on its own
terms, if for no other reason than the fact that he can be expected to
34 See Butler, supra note 26, at 59 (arguing that affirmative action is not stigmatizing).
35 See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 245-48 (1998)
(finding that affirmative action beneficiaries tend to support race-sensitive programs and sup-
port further emphasis on such policies).
See FosKETT, supra note 1, at 60, 80-81, 135 (describing Justice Thomas's appearance and
his experiences in high school and law school); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 136, 140-43 (describ-
ing Thomas's law school experience).
37 See, e.g., GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 59-61 (2002) (suggesting
that stigma from racism lends insight to contemporary problems affecting blacks in America);
Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669 (2005) (arguing
that dignity and racial justice are linked and that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) af-
firmed the dignity of gays); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803 (2004) (arguing that racial stigma is the main source of racial
harm and proposing a four-part test for determining whether an act or policy poses a risk of
stigmatic harm); Claude Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Per-
formance of African Americans, 69J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 797-811 (1995) (noting that
minorities under perform on standardized tests specifically when reminded of a stereotype re-
garding their groups' abilities before test taking).
38 See Lenhardt, supra note 37, at 809. For a somewhat different discussion of how stigma
relates to African American experience, which focuses on the black middle class, see Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, An Historical Note on the Soundness of the Stigma Rationale for a Civil Rights Landmark,
48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 991 (2004) (discussing how black elites in twentieth-century Atlanta devel-
oped flourishing socioeconomic structure within racially separate social and economic spaces).
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sit on the Court for at least another generation. Justice Thomas's
ideas unquestionably will help to shape the future of race relations in
this country. His emphasis on stigmatic racial harm may present new
opportunities for blacks and other minorities to seek equality
through the courts. For this reason, Justice Thomas's most recent
statements on race and educational opportunity, found in the Uni-
versity of Michigan affirmative action cases, are crucial considerations
as we ponder the Court's future race jurisprudence.
Here, I considerJustice Thomas's dissenting and concurring opin-
ion in Grutter v. Bollinger9 and reach an unexpected conclusion. On
the face of it, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion deserves the great-
est attention. By her swing vote, Justice O'Connor gave liberal civil
rights advocates a victory, snatched from the jaws of defeat.40 By con-
trast, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion, finding the University of
Michigan Law School's affirmative action policies unconstitutional,
continued his antagonistic relationship with liberal civil rights advo-
cates.4' However, a closer inspection of the two opinions reveals a
more complex reality. In some respects, Justice Thomas's discussion
of affirmative action has more depth and breadth than the utilitarian
justification for race-conscious policies offered by the University and
embraced in the majority opinion. Justice Thomas offers a racial cri-
tique of law school admissions criteria and opens the door to an ar-
gument that univeristies' knowing reliance on criteria that systemati-
cally favor whites should be understood as a form of discrimination
that is cognizable and remediable at law. In this way, Justice Thomas
expresses a "transformative" politics on the issue of access to elite law
school education.42
Professor Charles Lawrence advocates a "transformative," or struc-
tural, approach to the systemic problem of racial disadvantage in a
recent article critiquing the University of Michigan's defense of its af-S• 43
firmative action policies. This approach would emphasize the ways
in which traditional admissions criteria compound the educational
disadvantages to which blacks and other minorities are subjected in
lower school education and would recognize universities' moral re-
39 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
40 See Lynette Clemtson, NAACP Legal Defense Fund Chief Retires, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at
A10 (noting the Director Counsel's willingness to retire after the Supreme Court's decision up-
holding affirmative action in Grutter v. Bollinger); David Savage, Court Affirms Use of Race in Uni-
versity Admissions, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at 1 (noting that for the first time in recent history,
civil rights leaders celebrated a major victory).
41 For this view, see Butler, supra note 26, at 59.
42 See Charles Lawrence, Two Views of the River, A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Ac-
tion, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 928, 940 (2001) (characterizing the diversity defense as conservative
and perpetuating the status quo).
43 Id. at 963.
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sponsibility to correct for this systemic inequality. In its own way,
Justice Thomas's opinion aligns with Lawrence's call for a transfor-
mative approach to the issue of racial discrimination in higher educa-
tion. Justice Thomas's rhetoric is significant.45 It represents a rare in-
stance in which a Justice has explicitly and affirmatively rejected the
deficit modality of reasoning about minorities' right to equality in
education.46
Whether Justice Thomas's rhetoric can be deployed to articulate
antidiscrimination rights and remedies that he and other members of
the Court would embrace is, however, an entirely different and open
question. I will return to this question in the concluding section of
this Essay.
I. THE LIBERAL POSITION
The University of Michigan advanced a mainstream liberalJustifi-
cation for affirmative action in the Grutter and Gratz litigation. The
University set forth its case in two steps. First, it argued that enrolling
a diverse student body was central to its educational mission. Accord-
ing to the University, a diverse student body served the utilitarian pur-
pose of preparing students for the global workplace and a multicul-
tural society.48 Second, the University argued that a diverse student
body cannot be achieved without race-conscious measures. Why? For
the simple reason that minorities underperform, as compared to
whites on the criteria that the university uses in making admissions
decisions. Given the credentials gap, affirmative action was essential
for achieving racial diversity in selective institutions of higher educa-
tion. More specifically, the Law School argued that it "must consider
the race of applicants because a critical mass of underrepresented
minority students could not be enrolled if the admissions decisions
were based primarily on undergraduate GPAs and LSATs."50 Having
4 Id. at 943-46, 954 (noting that the reliance on high school GPAs benefits wealthier, non-
minority school districts which are able to offer advanced placement courses and that SAT
scores operate in an exclusionary fashion).
See infta notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
46 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is the paradigmatic case of the deficit
approach. See Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, J. Am. HIST.,June 2004, at 92-118.
47 See Lawrence, supra note 42, at 962-64 (describing the University administration's di-
lemma in deciding to argue a mainstream liberal approach or a transformative approach).
See Brief for Respondents Kimberly James, et al. at 24-25, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent James] (arguing that a diverse stu-
dent body is necessary to fulfill the objective of Brown and reduce stigma and discrimination).
49 See id. at 35-36 (arguing that the LSAT is not a color blind or nondiscriminatory standard
of equality).
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318 (quoting Erica Munzel, the University of Michigan's Director of
Admissions). The test score gap is the more problematic of the two measures. See William Kid-
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framed the problem in this way, the University avoided discussing the
question of whether altering its admissions criteria would enable it to
steer clear of race-conscious measures. Instead, it defended its race-
conscious policy as lawful under Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke1 because race was not the predominant factor in admissions
decisions.2  The University's policies were of the comjetitive, race-
plus variety that Justice Powell had endorsed in Bakke, rather than
per se unconstitutional racial quotas.54
The University largely ceded the matter of discrimination to the
plaintiffs.5  The plaintiffs' claims of discrimination were predicated
on the fact that whites, as a group, outperform minorities, as a group,
in the relevant admissions criteria. 5  As noted above, the University
did not (and could not) dispute the contention that its admissions
criteria systematically favor white applicants-upper-income-level
white applicants, in particular.57 Consequently, the battle over af-
firmative action in Grutter and Gratz was fought as a competition be-
tween higher-scoring whites and lower-scoring minorities.
Framed in these terms, the white plaintiffs were able to claim a
moral high ground. Affirmative action could be presented as an un-
fair racial spoils system in which minorities are rewarded despite aca-
demic deficiencies. This seemed especially so within the context of
the Grutter and Gratz cases because the University of Michigan de-
clined to justify affirmative action programs as remedies for discrimi-
der, Does the LSA T Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational Attainment, 89 CAL.
L. REV. 1055, 1095-1100 (2001) (arguing that heavy reliance on standardized tests penalizes
minority law school applicants); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 974, n.85 (1996) (concluding that high school grades are
more predictive of college freshman-year grades than SAT results).
5 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) ("[T]he state has a substantial interest that legitimately may be
served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of
race and ethic origin."); id. at 314 ("[T]he interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a
university's admissions program.").
52 The plaintiffs' expert conceded this point. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320.
53 438 U.S. at 317-18 (finding Harvard's program of using race as one factor among many
considered in making admissions decisions lawful).
Id. at 272-75 (finding program that set aside sixteen of one hundred seats in each year's
entering class for minorities and that funneled minorities through a separate admissions proc-
ess unlawful).
55 See Brief for Respondent James, supra note 48, at 21-25 (disavowing remedial justification
for affirmative action but acknowledging persistent racial stratification).
56 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316-20 (citing testimony during the bench trial by numerous deans
and faculty regarding academic performance by whites and minorities).
57 There is a correlation between race, wealth, and higher scores on the LSAT. See Lani
Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Comment: Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians
at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REv. 113, 141-49 (2003) (drawing a parallel
between economic mobility and academic performance); Kidder, supra note 50, at 1062-85 (de-
scribing the adverse impact of standardized testing on minority law school applications); Sturm
& Guinier, supra note 50, at 968-69, 982-97 (arguing that wealth strongly correlates with SAT
and LSAT performance).
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nation."' Instead, the University grounded its defense in the language
of today's political economy, "diversity."59 However, as the following
section describes, other parties to the litigation sought to disrupt this
utilitarian frame of reference by raising the problem of past and pre-
sent racial stratification as the defining issue in the cases.
II. THE INTERVENORS' CHALLENGE
The Grutter litigation featured a coalition of student-intervenors
that attempted to shift the terms of the debate in the case. The Coa-
lition to Defend Affirmative Action and Integration, and Fight for
Equality By Any Means Necessary ("BAMN") led the intervention.'
BAMN challenged the University's justification for affirmative ac-
tion, and therefore, the plaintiffs' presumption of moral superiority
in the debate over minority racial preferences.6' The intervenors' de-
fense of affirmative action programs struck at the heart of the plain-
tiffs' claims of entitlement to admission to the University. The Grutter
The University of Michigan has no history of discrimination against African Americans in
admissions. See GREG STOHR, A BLACK AND WHITE CASE: How AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SURVIVED
ITS GREATEST CHALLENGE 19-23 (2004) (describing the University of Michigan's admissions
policies). However, there were allegations and evidence that the University had engaged in ra-
cially discriminatory and exclusionary practices against blacks and other minorities who had
attended the University over time. For example, intervenors placed evidence in the record
showing the existence of segregated on-campus housing, organizations, and activities, and a
racially hostile climate on campus perpetrated by white professors, students, and staff, all sanc-
tioned by the University through acts of commission or omission. In addition, the intervenors
claimed that the University's admissions criteria are discriminatory. See Brief for Respondent
James, supra note 48, at 3-5 (describing bias in the University's admissions procedures since the
1950s); Brief of Respondent Ebony Patterson, et al. at 3, 5-17, 25-29, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (same).
59 For critiques of diversity as a basis for defending affirmative action, see Jack Greenberg,
Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610, 1616-20 (2003) (critiqu-
ing Justice O'Connor's justification of affirmative action); Lawrence, supra note 42, at 964-74
(contending that the "diversity defense" of affirmative action is too conservative a defense in
light of the racial inequality of secondary educational institutions); Deborah C. Malamud, Af-
firmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 941-47 (1997) (ar-
guing that addressing race-based inequality would more effectively achieve diversity than af-
firmative action).
60 BAMN is a protest-oriented group that links itself to the social movements of the 1960s. It
aims to complete the unfinished agenda of the mid-twentieth-century civil rights struggle. See
BAMN, Liberator Declaration, LIBERATOR: JOURNAL OF THE EMERGING NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, Sept. 2001, at 2 ("We declare our intention to defend affirmative action, integra-
tion and all the gains of the previous Civil Rights Movement."), available at http://
www.bamn.com/liberator/liberator-5.pdf.
61 The intervenors consisted of a coalition of several student groups, including Students
Supporting Affirmative Action ("SSAA"), United for Equality and Affirmative Action ("UEAA"),
Law Students for Affirmative Action ("LSAA"), and the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
and Integration, and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary ("BAMN"). For a description
of this coalition, see Miranda Massie, Representing the Student Intervenors in Grutter, JURIST, Sept.
5, 2003, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-aa/massie.php.
[Vol. 7:3
TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS
intervenors recasted the debate over the constitutionality of affirma-
tive action in terms that focused squarely on discrimination against
minorities, an issue that the plaintiffs altogether avoided and the Uni-
versity minimized. The intervenors' defense pointed to the racial,
class, and gender bias that universities knowingly perpetuate by rely-
ing so heavily on putatively "standardized" tests of ability in admis-
sions decisions.6 ' They argued that these criteria necessitate race-
conscious admissions policies, not the academic deficiencies of bene-
ficiaries. s In other words, they argued that affirmative action ad-
dresses the dysfunctional structure of access to higher education.
The intervenors sought to turn both the plaintiffs' case and the Uni-
versity's defense on their heads.
More specifically, BAMN argued that high-stakes tests and other
discriminatory admissions criteria are linchpins of the caste-like struc-
ture of the American socioeconomic system. According to the inter-
venors, these criteria funnel blacks and Hispanics into inferior
schools at all levels, including K-12 education, college, and law
school, and restrict these groups primarily to lower-paying, lower-
skilled jobs." Thus, the very premise of the plaintiffs' case-that
whites with better qualifications faced discrimination by virtue of af-
firmative action programs benefiting minorities-was false.65 It is per-
verse, they asserted, to claim that the "problem" that race-conscious
admissions practices address is the limited academic ability of minori-
ties.i For the relevant admission measures do a poor job of predict-
ing future academic or job performance of many students, including
African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, certain Asian
groups, women, and students from working class or poor back-
grounds.67 They are most useful for efficient processing of applica-
See Brief for Respondent James, supra note 48, at 3-6, 38-49 (describing discriminatory
effects of heavy use of standardized tests in law school admissions).
62 Id.
See Greg Winter, The Supreme Court: The Demonstrators; Thousands of Students Gather Outside
Court in Support of Admission Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at A14 (attributing student dem-
onstrations in support of affirmative action to the belief that the Court's decision would have a
direct impact on their lives). See generally Brief for Respondent James, supra note 48, at 33-37
(arguing that an end to affirmative action would lead to the immediate resegregation of law
schools and subsequently, the profession itself).
See Brief for Respondent James, supra note 48, at 18-20 (arguing that the plaintiffs' case
relies on the false notion that the LSAT is non-discriminatory).
See id. at 22-23 (arguing that race-conscious admissions seek to eliminate the racial bias of
the LSAT and admissions criteria)
67 See Guinier supra note 57, at 137-51 (describing the inconsistency between admissions
criteria and student performance); Kidder, supra note 50, at 1062-85 (finding that standardized
testing has an adverse impact in admission of similarly qualified minorities); Sturm & Guinier,
supra note 50, at 982-97 (finding a strong correlation between wealth and standardized test per-
formance). But see Kidder, supra note 50, at 1089-94 (describing study results indicating that
the LSAT over predicts law school performance by African Americans and Latinos).
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tions and for predicting the performance of wealthy whites, males in
particular68 Even the designers of the test concede that its measures
are imperfect predictors of ability and are misused when applied to
groups for whom they are poor predictors of ability, the intervenors
noted.69
The same groups for whom the predictive value of standardized
tests is inadequate are typically beneficiaries of affirmative action
policies, including those of the University of Michigan. 70  Thus, for
BAMN, these policies are necessary to offset the bias that universities
knowingly perpetuate and entrench by relying on flawed criteria in
making admissions decisions.7' Affirmative action in admissions is,
then, a form of distributive and corrective justice.72 It promotes the
integrative ideal established in Brown v. Board of Education, a more
egalitarian educational structure, and thus a more egalitarian democ-
73racy.
III. THE GRUTTER MAJORITY OPINION
The Grutter majority opinion demonstrated that the intervenors'
perspective was a distant consideration. None of the Justices who
68 See Kidder, supra note 50, at 1080-1109 (detailing a study showing that the LSAT is a bet-
ter predictor of white male performance than minorities).
See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Center for Fair and Open Testing at 10, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (quoting from a report by the Law School Admis-
sion Council cautioning that test misuse and over reliance on LSAT scores flow from law
schools' obsession with classroom diversity and ranking by the U.S. News & World Report).
70 Michigan's definition of underrepresented minorities was limited to African Americans,
Hispanics, and Native Americans. See Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003).
71 See Transcript of Argument by Miranda Massie at 71, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Massie Transcript] (arguing that "[there is] a systematic dou-
ble standard that operates to favor white people ... [a] nd affirmative action operates to offset
that double standard"); BAMN, Why and How We Must Defend Affirmative Action, LIBERATOR, Nov.
1997, at 1 (noting BAMN's stance that affirmative action was implemented to offset social ine-
quality), available at http://www.bamn.com/liberator/liberator-I.pdf.
See Brief for Respondent James, supra note 48, at 41 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1978)) (discussing Justice Powell's observation that a showing of
bias in entry credentials could be a valid basis for upholding race-conscious admissions). Some
scholars have noted the tension between corrective and distributive justice. See Peter Benson,
The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 515 (1992) (con-
trasting and discussing the relationship between corrective and distributive justice). However,
constitutional scholars who have written about structural injunctions in education, such as
school desegregation decrees, have understood these decrees in terms of corrective justice, de-
spite its inexact fit. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Cor-
rective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728 (1986) (discussing the corrective approach of the law to
remediate effects of past discrimination).
73 See Massie Transcript, supra note 71, at 67-70 (defining the basic question in the case as
whether black students who suffered in integrating schools in wake of Brown would have suf-
fered "in vain"); STOHR, supra note 58, at 164 (citing Massie's argument equating allowing af-
firmative action with taking a step toward equality, justice, and democracy).
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supported race-conscious admissions policies engaged the interve-
nors' discrimination claim. Instead, the majority opinion was framed
in terms of the viability and legitimacy of our socioeconomic struc-
ture. Rather than reasoning about this theme with minorities at the
center of analysis, however, the majority opinion concerned itself
primarily with utilitarian concerns. The decision principally justified
diversity-based affirmative action in higher education as an engine for
advancing national security,14 the domestic and global economy,' and
76legitimizing the political and legal structures.
The Court disregarded the intervenors' credentials bias argument,
though it was undisputed by the plaintiffs and the University. In do-
ing so, the majority rejected the intervenors' attempt to cast race-
sensitive admissions as a remedy for the University's use of discrimi-
natory admissions criteria." Justice O'Connor expressed deference
to the Law School's judgment about how best to assemble student
bodies with a critical mass of minority students. Requiring the Uni-
versity of Michigan to reconfigure its admissions criteria would be a
"drastic" remedy, she stated.79 The majority's rhetoric went beyond
expressions of deference to the University's expertise. The opinion
also revealed the majority's faith that the University's admissions cri-
teria measure ability or aptitude. Justice O'Connor noted that the
Law School's use of race neutral alternatives to the criteria then in
place at Michigan would mean "a dramatic sacrifice of... the aca-
demic quality of all students."80 The majority did not otherwise re-
spond to the structural critique of selective higher education that the
intervenors posited. Strikingly, it was Justice Thomas who engaged
this issue in his opinion.
IV. JUSTICE THOMAS'S OPINION
Rather than situating his analysis around the facts as presented by
the plaintiffs and the University, both of which depicted minority stu-
dents as academically deficient,8' Justice Thomas's opinion discussed
74 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (asserting that a racially diverse officer
corps is essential to the military's function of providing national security).
75 Id. at 307-08, 330-33 (discussing the needs of businesses in terms of skills developed
through exposure to diverse cultures and people as well as the interest in opening the path to
leadership to qualified individuals).
76 Id. at 330-33 (explaining that education is the foundation of good citizenship which en-
tails participation in civic life on every level including as the nation's leaders).
See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
78 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (deferring to the school's judgment that critical mass cannot be
achieved through race-neutral means without abandoning selectivity).
79 Id. at 340.
80 Id.
81 See supra notes 49-50, 55-57 and accompanying text.
Feb. 2005]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the structural factors that animate the push for affirmative action.
This is the context that the plaintiffs and defendant avoided, and that
the BAMN intervenors insisted was integral to a full and fair assess-
ment of the constitutionality of the Law School's affirmative action
programs. As we know, Justice Thomas disagreed with the interve-
nors' argument that affirmative action is an appropriate remedial re-
sponse to systemic bias in admissions. But Justice Thomas, alone
among the Justices, recognized the limitations inherent in the Uni-
versity's vision of equal protection.
According to Justice Thomas, the University of Michigan Law
School's "need" to use race-conscious criteria to attain a diverse stu-
dent body was a "self-inflicted wound. 8 2 This is the major theme of
Justice Thomas's opinion challenging the University's claim that it is
unable to maintain its deep commitment to a racially diverse student
body without resort to affirmative action. The University argued that
it should not have to abandon "selectivity" as a "core part of its educa-
tional mission" in its quest to achieve racially diverse learning envi-
ronments. 83 Justice Thomas seized upon what he viewed as the
twisted nature of the University's argument: the choice between "se-
lectivity" and "diversity" was one of its own making. But for the Uni-
versity's heavy reliance upon discriminatory admissions criteria as a
sorting mechanism, the aspirations for diversity and selectivity would
not be in tension. The precise language of Justice Thomas's critique
of the Law School's argument is worth noting at length. He wrote:
[N]o modern law school can claim ignorance of the poor performance
of blacks, relatively speaking, on the Law School Admissions Test
(LSAT). Nevertheless, law schools continue to use the test and then at-
tempt to "correct" for black underperformance by using racial discrimi-
nation in admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic student body. The
Law School's continued adherence to measures it knows produce racially
skewed results is not entitled to deference by this Court.... Having de-
cided to use the LSAT, the Law School must accept the constitutional
burdens that come with this decision. The Law School may freely con-
tinue to employ the LSAT and other allegedly merit-based standards in
whatever fashion it likes. What the Equal Protection Clause forbids, but
the Court today allows, is the use of these standards hand-in-hand with
racial discrimination. An infinite variety of admissions methods are
available to the Law School. Considering all of the radical thinking that
has historically occurred at this country's universities, the Law School's
intractable approach toward admissions is striking.
84
In Justice Thomas's view, the practice of affirmative action hides the
real problem surrounding access to higher education: the admissions
82 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350.
83 Id. at 340.
84 Id at 369-70 (emphasis added).
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system is fundamentally flawed. It is racially discriminatory due in
part, he suggested, to universities' lack of will and imagination re-
garding race-neutral means of selecting student bodies. The Univer-
sity's "standards" constitute a willfully "exclusionary admissions sys-
tem."
85
Justice Thomas argued that, if necessary, the entrenched system of
selective higher education should give way to broader access to legal
education. According to Justice Thomas, should selective law
schools continue to insist that there is a tension between selectivity
and diversity, and that minorities' underperformance on admissions
criteria creates this tension, then selectivity should yield.8 7 "[T] here is
nothing ancient, honorable, or constitutionally protected about 'se-
lective' admissions," Justice Thomas claimed. To the contrary, the
history of standardized testing upon which the selective admissions
system is based is tied inextricably to the nation's history of discrimi-
nation.89  Historically, "selective admissions ha[ve] been the vehicle
for racial, ethnic, and religious tinkering and experimentation by
university administrators," a way for schools to "select racial winners
and losers."90 Justice Thomas pointed, in particular, to the use of "in-
telligence tests" by many of the nation's most prominent universities,
including Columbia and Harvard, to discriminate against Jewish ap-
plicants during the early twentieth century." The tests were facially
neutral; but the discriminatory scheme worked because Jews "scored
worse on such tests" than white gentiles, as officials well knew. Thus,
Columbia officials could claim that "[w]e have not eliminated boys
because they were Jews," but had "honestly attempted to eliminate
the lowest grade of applicant."98  It simply had "turn[ed] out that a
good many of the low grade men are New York City Jews."94 "[T] he
Id. at 361.
See id. at 368 ("The Equal Protection Clause does not, however, prohibit the use of un-
seemly legacy preferences or many other kinds of arbitrary admissions procedures. What the
Equal Protection Clause does prohibit are classifications made on the basis of race.").
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text (describing the history of testing methods
aimed at discriminating in admissions decisions).
90 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369 (Thomas,J., concurring).
91 Id.
92 Id.
9I Id. (quoting Letter from Herbert E. Hawkes, Dean, Columbia College, to E.B. Wilson
(June 16,1922), reprinted in H. WECHSLER, THE QUALIFIED STUDENT 160-61 (1977)).
94 Id. For a discussion of how anti-Semitism and other forms of racism were used during the
early twentieth century to "standardize" admissions to law schools and the bar, see JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 24-28, 65-66,
95-121 (1976); see also Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85
CAL. L. REv. 1449, 1475-94 (1997) (same).
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tests were adopted with full knowledge of their disparate impact," Jus-
tice Thomas concluded.95
Given the discriminatory history and effects of these admissions
measures and his view that the "entire process is poisoned by numer-
ous exceptions to 'merit,"' such as legacy admissions,96 Justice Tho-
mas endorsed a more egalitarian system. "l[T] here is much to be said
for the view that the use of tests and other measures to 'predict' aca-
demic performance is a poor substitute for a system that gives every
applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the study of law."97 For
Justice Thomas, a system in which all applicants who meet "minimum
qualifications" are admitted would be preferable to the system cur-
rently in place.98 Although Justice Thomas professed sympathy for
the proponents of affirmative action, 99 he would not support reme-
dies for racial discrimination that cover up and correct for a law
school's decision to rely on an "exclusionary admissions system"
known to perpetuate unequal access to schooling.100 "[T]he Law
School should be forced to choose between its classroom aesthetic
and its exclusionary admissions system-it cannot have it both ways,"
Justice Thomas argued. °
It is here, on the question of remedy, that Justice Thomas parts
company with the intervenors, the Grutter majority, and liberal civil
rights groups. Whereas Justice O'Connor noted that requiring uni-
versities to use race-neutral alternatives to affirmative action would be
a "drastic remedy,"10 2 Justice Thomas took precisely the opposite view.
Justice Thomas argued that universities' use of race-conscious meas-
ures was the more drastic remedy.0 " Given Justice Thomas's belief
that race consciousness is fundamentally antithetical to the Equal
Protection Clause,0 4 it is preferable for universities to cease using cri-
teria that systematically disfavor blacks and Hispanics.1 0 5 In Justice
Thomas's view, African Americans (and others) are full members of
95 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369.
96 Id. at 367-68.
97 Id. at 367.
98 Id. at 361-62.
99 Id. at 350. ("Because I wish to see all students succeed whatever their color, I share, in
some respect, the sympathies of those who sponsor the type of discrimination advanced by the
University of Michigan Law School.").
100 Id.
'o' Id. at 361.
1o Id. at 340.
10s See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364-67 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(contending that race-conscious remedies may impair the learning potential of African Ameri-
can students).
104 See id. at 368 ("What the Equal Protection Clause does prohibit are classifications made on
the basis of race.").
105 See id. at 371 ("[Tlhe majority still cannot commit to the principle that racial classifica-
tions are per se harmful.").
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the sociopolitical community, on equal footing with whites, rather
than special pleaders. As equal stakeholders, minorities and all
groups are entitled to an educational structure that facilitates their
ability to accumulate socioeconomic capital, rather than one that im-
pedes it.'0 7 Thus, for Justice Thomas, the discriminatory criteria that
Michigan employs are the problem.
Justice Thomas refused to condone race-conscious admissions not
only because of his absolute belief in colorblind constitutionalism, "8
but also due to his view that affirmative action causes the separate
harm of stigmatizing "beneficiaries."'0 9 Justice Thomas viewed the
University's continued use of racially discriminatory admissions crite-
ria and its use of affirmative action to correct them as proof that the
University doubted black applicants' abilities."' Aligning himself with
the sentiments of the abolitionist Frederick Douglass,' Justice Tho-
mas passionately rejected the University's condescension. "Like
Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American
life without the meddling of university administrators. " 2 Justice
Thomas's explicit rejection of the assumption that African Americans
are intellectually and socially deficient is a welcomed deviation from
the apparent consensus, even among many white liberals, that the ra-
cial test gap reflects real racial differences in ability."3
Whereas the Court's conservatives, especially justices Thomas and
Scalia, are sometimes lumped together without distinction by crit-
ics," 4 Justice Thomas's advocacy of race-neutral criteria in Grutter was,
in fact, different from the meritocratic platitudes of Justice Scalia.
Justice Scalia uncritically accepted the plaintiffs' simplistic views of
merit and their corresponding narrative of entitlement to admis-
106 Id. at 374.
107 See id. at 378.
108 See id.
1 See id. at 371-74 (discussing the stigmatizing effects of race-based classifications on black
and Hispanic students).
Io See id. at 369-70 ("[L]aw schools continue to use the [LSAT, which they know produces
skewed results,] and then attempt to 'correct' for black underperformance by using racial dis-
crimination in admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic student body.").
I Id. at 350 (quoting Douglass's command to "give [the Negro] a chance to stand on his
own legs").
112 Id.
1s See Kidder, supra note 50, at 1080-81 (noting consensus among otherwise sharply divided
scholars that racial/ethnic differences in LSAT scores reflect real underlying differences in aca-
demic or cognitive skills).
114 See THOMAS, supra note 1, at 462, 499-50, 565-66 (describing Thomas and Scalia's tandem
patterns and Thomas's disagreement with criticism that he is a clone of Scalia). Interestingly,
some commentators have also claimed thatJustice Marshall was a stooge of anotherJustice, Jus-
tice Brennan. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 47-48 (1979) (noting that Marshall often followed Brennan's opinions on finer points
of law).
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sion."5  During oral argument, Justice Scalia responded to the Uni-
versity counsel's defense of race consciousness by instructing the Uni-
versity to, 'Just lower your qualification standards. You don't have to
be the great college you are. You can be a lesser college if that value
[of diversity] is important enough to you. '" 6 Justice Scalia's remark
clearly suggested that the University's criteria accurately captured dif-
ferences in applicants' aptitude."7 Justice Thomas's skepticism that
traditional admissions' criteria measure merit sets him decidedly
apart from Justice Scalia.
Far from following Justice Scalia's lead, Justice Thomas aligned
himself with the most radical voice in the litigation, the Grutter inter-
venors (albeit without explicitly acknowledging them)."" Justice
Thomas's stance also mirrored the criticism of the Law School's ad-
missions standards leveled by several of the University's amicus curiae
supporters, including the Yale, Harvard, and Stanford Black Law Stu-
dents' Associations,' the National Center for Fair and Open Test-
ing, °' and the Society of American Law Teachers. 21 Moreover, Justice
Thomas's rhetoric resembled elements of the critique that scholars
on the2political left have made against traditional notions of merit for
years.
115 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346-49. Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy invoked the theme of unde-
serving minority beneficiaries of affirmative action as well. See id. at 380-85 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Id. at 389-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
116 See STOHR, supra note 58, at 282 (describing the University of Michigan's admissions poli-
cies).
117 See id. at 285.
118 Justice Thomas did, however, cite the brief of several Black Law Students' Associations,
which questioned heavy reliance on the LSAT. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 370. In the interests of
full disclosure, I should note that I was a member of the team of lawyers from Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison who wrote the BLSAs' amicus brief in Grutter v. Bollinger in sup-
port of the respondent, the University of Michigan School of Law. The team was led by Ted
Wells and included David Brown and Melanca Clark. See Brief of Amici Curiae Harvard Black
Law Students Ass'n., et. al., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at
http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/gru-amicus-ussc/um.html.
120 Brief of Harvard BLSA et al. at 27, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
IS0 Brief of the National Center for Fair and Open Testing at 7-25, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
121 Brief of the Society of American Law Teachers at 16-19, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241).
2 See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 99-110 (1991) (describing the
ramifications of the paradigm that "white equals good" and "black equals bad"); Derrick Bell,
Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1630-31 (2003) (noting that standardized tests
are poor predictors of academic performance and the striking link between test scores and
privilege); Guinier, supra note 57, at 141-49 (discussing relationship between economic mobil-
ity and academic performance); Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability"Job
Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1158, passim (1991) (discussing discrimination and meritocracy in
employment testing); Lawrence, supra note 42, at 964-74 (describing the "transformative" ap-
proach to systematic racial disadvantage); Roithmayr, supra note 94, at 1475-94, nn.84-86 (ar-
guing that merit standards incorporate biases favorable to dominant social groups); Michael
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CONCLUSION
Justice Thomas's analytical approach in Grutter was concerned
about structural inequality in the law school admissions process, per-
petuated by the LSAT-a test that is said to be neutral and objective,
but which in reality is racially stigmatizing.1 2 In light of this stigma,
Thomas suggested that elite law schools should reassess their deci-
sion to privilege efficiency over substantive fairness, and therefore,
reconfigure their admissions practices. Thomas's rhetoric eclipsed
the liberal defense of affirmative action, which, as Professor Charles
Lawrence observes, "buttress[es] the structure of race and class sub-
ordination"2 4 and is a "case for the integration of a privileged class. 123
In his own way, Justice Thomas embraced a more transformative ap-
proach to educational access-an approach that, in an important re-
spect, is aligned with the vision of equality that Professor Lawrence
advocates. 129
Justice Thomas's beliefs that the Constitution requires color-
blindness and that any and all race-conscious policies breed stigma
are subject to debate. But disagreement with Justice Thomas's end-
point should not overshadow the fact that his opinion contains a
forceful critique of universities' knowing reliance on admissions cri-
teria that poorly measure the ability of the typical African American
and Hispanic, working-class or poor, law school applicant. In this re-
spect Justice Thomas's rhetoric went beyond what the University and
the Grutter majority offered.
It is, of course, important not to overstate the significance of Jus-
tice Thomas's opinion in Grutter. It is but one opinion. I do not
mean to equate its highly suggestive language with a majority opinion
that creates binding jurisprudence regarding race-based admissions.
Justice Thomas's rhetoric may mostly reflect his expression of disdain
for the white liberal elites and affirmative action policies that he per-
ceives as having tarnished his own hard won educational and career
Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Effwiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV.
1251, passim (1995) (discussing affirmative action and testing in the employment context);
Sturm & Guinier, supra note 50, at 971-89 (questioning the reliability of standardized testing as
an accurate predictor of academic success). But see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) (defending
traditional admissions criteria).
123 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 367 ("[T]here is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and
other measures to 'predict' academic performance is a poor substitute for a system that gives
every applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the study of law.").
t2 Lawrence, supra note 42, at 952.
125 Id. at 941.
126 See id. at 964 (arguing that integration of universities and race-conscious admissions poli-
cies help to "conquer the scourge of American apartheid").
Feb. 2005]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
achievements. 2 1 It also is important to note that Justice Thomas's
critique overlaps with the transformative vision that Professor Law-
rence proposes, but does not constitute a coherent vision of equality.
Justice Thomas implied that a frontal assault on the LSAT is plausi-
ble, but stopped there. He failed to connect his racial critique of law
school admissions criteria to an understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment that would reach and remedy the discrimination that
these facially neutral standards perpetuate. That said, Justice Tho-
mas's opinion is certainly provocative, and it would be a mistake to
ignore it.
The prospective question is whether, and under what circum-
stances, Justice Thomas would revisit the issue of structural discrimi-
nation in education, and whether his rhetoric can be deployed to ar-
ticulate rights and remedies that would advance the cause of racial
justice. Justice Thomas will be among the Justices who consider what
are likely to be new challenges to affirmative action in university ad-
missions in coming years. As Justice Scalia predicts, these challenges
will test the meaning of Grutter's narrow tailoring prong. 18 There is
every indication that Justice Thomas will vote to interpret Grutter to
bar most race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.
Civil rights lawyers are likely to react to such a development with new
legal challenges of their own. A frontal assault on the admissions cri-
teria used by selective universities seems inevitable, despite unfavor-
able case law.' 29 Justice Thomas's opinion implies that he would seri-
ously entertain such a legal challenge. In fact, his concern about
racial stigma might provide a basis for attacking facially race-neutral
criteria that, in practice, brands most blacks, other minoritieg, lower-
income applicants, and some women, as academic inferiors. Tho-
mas's approach opens the door to an argument that these stigmatiz-
ing criteria should be understood as a form of discrimination that is
cognizable and remediable at law.
Assuming Justice Thomas could be convinced that facially neutral
criteria are unlawful under the Constitution or federal statutory law,
his resistance to race-conscious remedies would remain. For him, the
17 See, e.g., FOSKETT, supra note 1, at 60-66, 74-83, 118-24, 130-33 (discussing Thomas's per-
ception that he was stigmatized by affirmative action and his shift away from his formerly liberal
leanings); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 133-38, 140-43, 567-68 (describing Thomas's development
of conservative views during law school).
128 539 U.S. at 348-49.
19 One such case is the particularly difficult Alexander v. Sandoval 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (hold-
ing that there is no private right of action under Title VI). See, e.g., Benjamin Superfine, At the
Intersection of Law and Psychometrics: Explaining the Validity Clause of No Child Left Behind, 33 J.L. &
EDUC. 475 (2004) (discussing the validity of standardized testing from a psychometric and judi-
cial perspective). For a pre-Sandoval discussion of such a legal challenge under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, see Roithmayr, supra note 94, at 1496-1501.
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bias perpetuated by racially discriminatory admissions criteria would
not provide a new and different rationale for race-conscious correc-
tive measures in admissions, as some, including the Grutter interve-
nors, have argued.'so Only a race-neutral remedy would satisfy Justice
Thomas. Even then, the concerns that he has expressed about struc-
tural injunctions in the context of lower school and higher education
might limit the scope of such remedies.' Hence, even race-neutral
remedies would test and potentially stretch Justice Thomas's skepti-
cism about systematic remedies, notwithstanding his potential ame-
nability to an antidiscrimination right against structural racism in
university admissions.
Justice Thomas's opinions in Grutter, Jenkins, and Zelman begin a
complex conversation in the Court's race jurisprudence about reme-
dies for structural inequality, stigma, and citizenship. His analytical
approach raises some pressing questions. How can equal protection
doctrine address the harms arising from racial discrimination without
perpetuating the harms associated with racial categorization? How
can structural remedies, designed to rectify status-based harms, be
broad enough to grant class-wide relief, but individuated enough to
preserve personal autonomy and dignity? These are critical questions
that courts, constitutional scholars, and advocates of racial justice
must answer in the post-civil rights era. And so, too, must Justice
Thomas.
130 See Brief for Respondent James, supra note 48, at 2-45 (arguing for race-conscious admis-
sions policies); Roithmayr, supra note 94, at 1496-1501 (suggesting practical applications of de-
constructive insights when litigating numeric-based law school admission standards).
131 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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